We investigate pricing decisions and information value in two competing supply chains, each consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. Both retailers are engaged in Bertrand retail competition and are endowed with the private information on the disrupted demand. Three information sharing scenarios have been considered, i.e., information sharing in both chains, information sharing in only one chain, and information sharing in neither chain. For each information scenario, there always exists robustness for each manufacturer’s production plan. That is, when the disrupted amount of the market demand is sufficiently small, the manufacturer’s production plan or the retailer’s order quantity will be unchanged. Meanwhile, we also study the information value by comparing these three information scenarios, and find that the information value not only works in one chain directly, but also does in the competing chain indirectly. Through comparative analysis, we find that the retailer is reluctant to share his private information on the disrupted demand with his partner because of the fear of information leakage. Meanwhile, the performance of the whole chain may become worse off if the information of disrupted demand is shared in this chain.
Accepté le :
DOI : 10.1051/ro/2016062
Mots-clés : Supply chain competition, information sharing, game theory, disruption management, robustness
@article{RO_2017__51_3_779_0, author = {Chen, Kebing and Feng, Meiling and Yang, Lei}, title = {Information sharing for competing supply chains with demand disruption}, journal = {RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Op\'erationnelle}, pages = {779--804}, publisher = {EDP-Sciences}, volume = {51}, number = {3}, year = {2017}, doi = {10.1051/ro/2016062}, mrnumber = {3880525}, zbl = {1384.90012}, language = {en}, url = {http://archive.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2016062/} }
TY - JOUR AU - Chen, Kebing AU - Feng, Meiling AU - Yang, Lei TI - Information sharing for competing supply chains with demand disruption JO - RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle PY - 2017 SP - 779 EP - 804 VL - 51 IS - 3 PB - EDP-Sciences UR - http://archive.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2016062/ DO - 10.1051/ro/2016062 LA - en ID - RO_2017__51_3_779_0 ER -
%0 Journal Article %A Chen, Kebing %A Feng, Meiling %A Yang, Lei %T Information sharing for competing supply chains with demand disruption %J RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle %D 2017 %P 779-804 %V 51 %N 3 %I EDP-Sciences %U http://archive.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2016062/ %R 10.1051/ro/2016062 %G en %F RO_2017__51_3_779_0
Chen, Kebing; Feng, Meiling; Yang, Lei. Information sharing for competing supply chains with demand disruption. RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle, Tome 51 (2017) no. 3, pp. 779-804. doi : 10.1051/ro/2016062. http://archive.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2016062/
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