Mental models, model-theoretic semantics, and the psychosemantic conception of truth
Philosophia Scientiae, Aperçus philosophiques en logique et en mathématiques, Tome 9 (2005) no. 2, pp. 259-278. 
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Elqayam, Shira. Mental models, model-theoretic semantics, and the psychosemantic conception of truth. Philosophia Scientiae, Aperçus philosophiques en logique et en mathématiques, Tome 9 (2005) no. 2, pp. 259-278. http://archive.numdam.org/item/PHSC_2005__9_2_259_0/

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