A new axiomatization of a class of equal surplus division values for TU games
RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle, Tome 52 (2018) no. 3, pp. 935-942.

In this paper, we propose a variation of weak covariance named as non-singleton covariance, requiring that changing the worth of a non-singleton coalition in a TU game affects the payoffs of all players equally. We establish that this covariance is characteristic for the convex combinations of the equal division value and the equal surplus division value, together with efficiency and a one-parameterized axiom treating a particular kind of players specially. As special cases, parallel axiomatizations of the two values are also provided.

DOI : 10.1051/ro/2017024
Classification : 91A12
Mots-clés : TU game, equal division value, equal surplus division value, nullifying player, dummifying player
Hu, Xun-Feng 1 ; Li, Deng-Feng 1

1 
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Hu, Xun-Feng; Li, Deng-Feng. A new axiomatization of a class of equal surplus division values for TU games. RAIRO - Operations Research - Recherche Opérationnelle, Tome 52 (2018) no. 3, pp. 935-942. doi : 10.1051/ro/2017024. http://archive.numdam.org/articles/10.1051/ro/2017024/

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