Jeux répétés
Tomala, Tristan1
1 Ceremade, Université Paris Dauphine, Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, 75775 Paris cedex 16
Journées mathématiques X-UPS, Théorie des jeux – Introduction à la théorie des jeux répétés (2006), pp. 23-43.
Publié le :
DOI : 10.5802/xups.2006-02
Tomala, Tristan 1

1 Ceremade, Université Paris Dauphine, Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, 75775 Paris cedex 16 
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Tomala, Tristan. Jeux répétés. Journées mathématiques X-UPS, Théorie des jeux – Introduction à la théorie des jeux répétés (2006), pp. 23-43. doi : 10.5802/xups.2006-02. http://archive.numdam.org/articles/10.5802/xups.2006-02/

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