Radical scientific discovery and the associated radical “paradigm change” are treated here as following from the disclosure of what I call background ‘assumptions'. These are taken as more or less equivalent to the “hinge propositions” that Wittgenstein discusses in his On Certainty. On this basis, various issues connected to meaning variance, theory change, incommensurability and so forth, are discussed. It is shown that Kuhn's overall account need not, with qualifications, imply either idealism or relativism while rationality and scientific progress can be saved in a way that may be acceptable by practising scientists.
La découverte scientifique radicale, et le changement radical de paradigme associé, sont traités ici comme découlant de la mise à jour de ce qu'on appelle des ‘assomptions' d'arrière-plan. Celles-ci sont considérées comme plus ou moins équivalentes aux ‘propositions charnières' discutées par Wittgenstein dans De la certitude. Sur cette base, diverses questions liées aux changements de signification, au changement théorique, à l'incommensurabilité, etc., sont discutées. On montre que la conception d'ensemble de Kuhn, une fois précisée, n'implique ni l'idéalisme ni le relativisme, et que la rationalité et le progrès scientifique peuvent être sauvés d'une manière acceptable par les scientifiques praticiens.
@article{PHSC_2004__8_1_169_0, author = {Baltas, Aristides}, title = {On the grammatical aspects of radical scientific discovery}, journal = {Philosophia Scientiae}, pages = {169--201}, publisher = {\'Editions Kim\'e}, volume = {8}, number = {1}, year = {2004}, language = {en}, url = {http://archive.numdam.org/item/PHSC_2004__8_1_169_0/} }
Baltas, Aristides. On the grammatical aspects of radical scientific discovery. Philosophia Scientiae, Volume 8 (2004) no. 1, pp. 169-201. http://archive.numdam.org/item/PHSC_2004__8_1_169_0/
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